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INTRODUCTION

Securities fraud litigation under Rule lOb-51 threatens all pub
licly traded companies: according to the Stanford Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, in 1998 a securities fraud lawsuit was filed
for nearly every day that the stock markets were open.2 Some of
these lawsuits appear to be frivolous, triggered by inevitable fluctu
ations in stock prices (so-called "fraud by hindsight" complaints3),
while others represent legitimate efforts at private enforcement of
the securities laws.4
1. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998), prohibits "manipulative and deceptive de
vices . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." It was promulgated by the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") under § lO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See 7 Louis Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 348588 (3d ed. 1997).
2. Securities Fraud Litigation Sets Record in 1998: Companies Sued at a Rate Close to
One-A-Day (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://securities.stanford.edu/news/990125/pressrel.html>.
The Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu, re
ports active federal securities class action lawsuits, and new suits are posted daily. To counter
the perceived defense bias at the Stanford site, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (by
volume the largest plaintiffs' class action securities fraud firm) sponsors its own web site, at
http://www.milberg.com, which also reports ongoing suits and contains press releases from
Milberg Weiss.
3. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEc. & ExCH. CoMMN., REPORT To THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRAcnCE UNDER THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LmGATION REFORM Acr OF 1995, at 6 (1997) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
4. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730 (Statement of Managers - The "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995")
[hereinafter "Statement of Managers"] ("Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool
with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon govern
ment action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital mar
kets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors,
directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs."). Even though the Commission
never envisioned civil liability when it promulgated Rule lOb-5, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 1, at 3487, most securities fraud plaintiffs bring suit under Rule lOb-5 rather than § 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act because Rule lOb-5 is considerably more liberal than § 18. See
JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 677 (2d ed. 1997).
The Conference Committee Report for the Reform Act is broken into a recitation of the
text of the bill and a "Statement of Managers." The Statement of Managers contains the
relevant legislative history, and courts considering the Reform Act tend to identify it as the
"Statement of Managers" rather than as the "Conference Committee Report." This Note
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Disposition on the pleadings is a critical defense strategy for all
securities lawsuits. Securities fraud lawsuits that withstand a
12(b)(6) motion almost always settle, regardless of the actual merits
of the case or the probability of success at trial,5 because of the
massive discovery and defense costs associated with such suits.6
Because Rule lOb-5 requires a showing of scienter, a mental state
embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"7 defendants
can often successfully dispose of a securities fraud case before being
forced to settle by challenging the plaintiff's scienter pleading.8 For
these reasons, the standard for pleading scienter is an appropriate
context in which to balance the competing interests of eliminating
abusive claims and permitting meritorious ones.9
Prior to the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"),10 the federal circuit courts of appeals
had varying interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b)'s11 application to pleading scienter in a securities fraud law
suit.12 The Ninth Circuit's standard was quite liberal, while the
will follow the stylistic convention of the majority of courts, and generally refer to the "State
ment of Managers."
5. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 32 ("[I]nnocent parties are often forced to pay
exorbitant 'settlements.' When an [issuer] must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement pay
ments, and expend management and employee resources in defending a meritless suit, the
issuers' own investors suffer. Investors always are the ultimate losers when extortionate 'set
tlements' are extracted from issuers.").
6. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. C. C.A.N. 679, 685 ("The
dynamics of private securities litigation create powerful incentives to settle, causing securities
class actions to have a much higher settlement rate than other types of class actions. . . . The
settlement value to defendants turns more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of
the underlying claim."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739
(1975); Securities Litigation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin.
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Congress 35-36 (1994) (statement of
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt); H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995).
7. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Rule lOb-5 on its face contains
no explicit scienter requirement, but the Supreme Court inferred one in Ernst & Ernst.
8. Cf. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.
and Fin. of the House Comm on Commerce, 104th Cong. 199 (1995) (testimony of Arthur

Levitt, SE C Chairman) (describing Rule 9(b) challenges as "[t]he device most frequently
used to screen out deficient securities fraud claims").

9. See In re Tnne Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that an
overly rigid standard will create "opportunity for unremedied fraud," while an overly lax
standard will create "opportunity to extract an undeserved settlement"); City of Painesville v.
First Montauk Fm., Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 187 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S. C.).
11. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti
tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of m¥td of a person may be averred generally.").
12. Each circuit had articulated some common law pleading standard. For example, the
Frrst Circuit required, plaintiffs to plead facts with such particularity as to make it reasonable
to believe that the defendant acted with scienter. See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975
F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1��2). The Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to
a strong inference of.scienter., See, e.g., O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936
.
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Second Circuit's standard was quite strict. The Second Circuit re
quired facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of scienter and per
mitted two approaches to pleading such facts: alleging facts
establishing both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or alleg
ing facts sufficient to demonstrate circumstantial evidence of reck
less or conscious wrongdoing.13
Because most corporate defendants are subject to personal ju
risdiction in a variety of places, the variance among the circuits
(particularly the lax Ninth Circuit standard), created strong incen
tives for forum shopping and abuse. To address those concerns,14
Congress drafted the Reform Act in 1995 and passed it over
President Clinton's veto in December of that year.1s The key text
of the Reform Act, for purposes of this Note, is section 21D(b)(2)
- "Required State of Mind," which provides that:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particu
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.16
Federal district courts have exhibited confusion about the mean
ing of § 21D(b)(2), and the federal circuit courts of appeals have
divided on the issue.17 As one judge has noted, "widespread dis
agreement on the requirements of scienter permeates the federal
F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit followed the Second. See, e.g., In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting absence of law
in the Third Circuit prior to 1995 Reform Act and approving Second Circuit's standard for
use in cases not governed by the Reform Act). In re Burlington Coat Factory arose before
the effective date of the Reform Act. See 114 F.3d at 1418 n.6. The Ninth Circuit permitted
plaintiffs to plead the allegedly false or misleading statements and why they were false or
misleading. Plaintiffs were permitted to aver scienter generally. See, e.g., In re Glenfed Inc.
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
13. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time
Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69. This discussion focuses on the Second Circuit's case law because
Congress focused on that case law when it undertook legislation on this issue.

14. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The PSLRA effec
tively overturned the Ninth Circuit's lenient scienter pleading requirement • . . . ").
15. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737, 765 n.5 (enumerating the dates upon which the President vetoed the Act and both the
House and Senate overrode his veto).
16. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (Supp. ill 1997).
17. There are currently four circuit court opinions addressing this issue. 1\vo, Press v.
Chemical Inv. Services, Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) and Williams v. WMX
Technologies, 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997) assume without argument that the Reform Act

codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard. The Third Circuit reached the same conclu
sion in In re Advanta Securities Litigation, No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June
17, 1999). The Advanta court reviewed the legislative history in great detail, including the
legislative history for the Uniform Standards Act (discussed infra notes 75-80 and accompa
nying text), but ultimately concluded that "there is little to gain in attempting to reconcile the
conflicting expressions of legislative intent." Advanta, 1999 WL 395997, at *7. The Third
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court system."18 Although § 21D(b)(2) adopts the Second Circuit's
pleading standard verbatim - "facts giving rise to a strong infer
ence" of scienter - it does not speak directly to the tests that the
Second Circuit developed to explain that standard. Specifically,
two issues remain unresolved. First, it is unclear whether a plaintiff
may adequately plead scienter by pleading both motive and oppor
tunity. Second, it is unclear whether or not a plaintiff may ade
quately plead scienter by pleading circumstantial evidence of
reckless conduct.
To address this confusion, it is helpful to distinguish between the
Second Circuit's pleading standard and the tests developed by the
Second Circuit to explain that standard. While some cases use the
two concepts interchangeably,19 this Note reserves the terms
"pleading standard" and "standard" for the requirement that plead
ings raise a strong inference of scienter. This Note reserves the
term "tests" to refer to the Second Circuit's explanation of the ways
a plaintiff might demonstrate compliance with the pleading stan
dard - a showing of motive and opportunity or a showing of cir
cumstantial evidence indicating conscious or reckless wrongdoing.
Federal courts have sharply divided over the question of how
section 21D(b)(2) is to be interpreted. The central district of
California, in Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.,
has read the plain language of section 21D(b)(2) and its accompa
nying legislative history to mean that Congress chose to codify both
the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test and its circum
stantial evidence of recklessness tests.20 The Marksman rule has
Circuit therefore held that the plain language of the Reform Act, by incorporating the lan
guage of the Second Circuit's standard, also incorporated its tests. 1999 WL 395997, at *7.
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, Nos. 97-16204 & 9716240, 1999 WL 446521, at *1 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999), analyzed the legislative history, and
concluded that the Reform Act required plaintiffs to plead "in great detail, facts that consti
tute circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct." The opinion
essentially tracks the analysis of the District Court opinion, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.
Securities Litigation, No. C 97-0494, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 {N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). In
brief summary, the Ninth Circuit reached its holding by emphasizing elements in the legisla
tive history suggesting that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard nationwide.
Since the Second Circuit standard was in place when the Reform Act was enacted, the court
reasoned, the Reform Act must impose requirements more strict than those imposed by the
Second Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *5. For a response to this
reasoning, see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
18. Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. CIV-96-1514-PHX-RCS, at 19, (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998)
(Broomfield, J . ) (available at the Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse
{http://securities.stanford.edu)).
19. When such cases rely upon portions of the legislative history stating that the Reform
Act codified the pleading standard for the proposition that the Reform Act codified the tests,
this Note cites such cases verbatim, even at the risk of causing confusion. The use of "stan
dard" and "test" by the cases does not necessarily track this Note's usage of those terms - in
fact, part of this Note's argument is that some cases often mistake legislative history referring
to the standards for evidence of codification of the tests.
20. 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309-13 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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been widely followed by other districts,21 and essentially embraced
by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits.22 The Northern District of
California, by contrast, in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities
Litigation, viewed the same sources as evidence that the Reform
Act rejected the Second Circuit's tests in favor of a higher pleading
standard still - requiring that a plaintiff plead facts demonstrating
circumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing.23 The Silicon
Graphics rule has also found a wide following,24 and has been af
firmed by the Ninth Circuit.25
This Note concurs with a third group of cases, led by In re Baesa
Securities Litigation, 26 that have held that the Reform Act neither
codifies nor repudiates the Second Circuit's tests, but merely codi
fies the pleading standard and requires courts to evaluate specific
pleadings on a case-by-case basis.27 Some commentators misunder21. See, e.g., Gifford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., No. 96 C 4072, 1997 WL
757495, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 88 n.4
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 n.8 (N.D.N.Y.
1997), affd. per curiam, No. 97-7821, 1998 WL 640447 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 1998); Page v.
Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 WL 148558, at *9 & n.5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997);
Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin.
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997); STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., No. 396-CV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F.
Supp. 431, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
22. See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17,
1999); Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs., Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v. WMX
Techs., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997).
23. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (holding that the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to allege "specific facts
that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants").
24. See, e.g., Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (approving
Norwood and Friedberg); Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 CIV. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (holding that motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient
- additional facts must also be pleaded giving rise to a strong inference of scienter);
Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard above that of the Second Circuit);
Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038-39 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (approving Silicon Graphics);
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48 (D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting motive and
opportunity based on Conference Committee Report).
25. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521,
at *1 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999).
26. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
27. See In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242 ("[U]nder the Reform Act, and in contrast to
prior Second Circuit precedent, [particulars regarding motive and opportunity] are not pre
sumed sufficient [to raise a strong inference of scienter]. Rather . . . the pleadings must set
forth sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required scien
ter." (footnote omitted)); see also Malin v. IVAX Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (approving In re Baesa); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp.,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998) (approving In re Baesa and In re Health Manage·
ment); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998) (ap
proving In re Baesa); In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff may raise a strong inference by "pleading motive
and opportunity, conscious misbehavior, recklessness or by impressing upon the court a
novel legal theory").

June 1999]

Scienter Pleading Under the Reform Act

2271

stand the Baesa holding as rejecting motive and opportunity show
ings.28 When properly understood and read in light of subsequent
cases in the Baesa line,29 however, the Baesa rule merely requires
courts to evaluate a plaintiff 's factual allegations neutrally. Courts
should have no presumptions in favor of or against fixed formalistic
categories such as "motive and opportunity," and should determine
on a case-by-case basis whether or not plaintiffs' pleadings raise a
strong inference of scienter.
This Note argues that the Reform Act neither codified nor pro
hibited the Second Circuit's tests, but merely codified the Second
Circuit's pleading standard and left courts to apply the standard on
a case-by-case basis.30 The Reform Act essentially shifted the locus
of uncertainty away from the various tests in various circuits - mo
tive and opportunity, circumstantial evidence of recklessness - to
28. One commentator misreads Baesa as holding that a showing of motive and opportu
nity is facially insufficient to meet the Reform Act formulation. Compare Ryan G. Miest,
Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1126 (1998) ("The
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test is inconsistent with this focus [on unifying and
strengthening procedural pleading standards] and should not be applied under 21D(b)(2).")
and id. at 1128 ("The Baesa standard ...eliminates motive and opportunity as an alternative
pleading method ....") with In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp.at 242 ("This, of course, does not mean
that particulars regarding motive and opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circum
stances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In some cases,
they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so. But, under the Reform Act ...they are
not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under the Reform Act formulation, the pleadings
must set forth sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the re
quired scienter." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
For a more plaintiff-oriented view of the Reform Act, see William S.LeRach & Eric Alan
Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:

Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893 (1996).

29. Even if Baesa did take such a harsh view of motive and opportunity showings, later
cases in the Baesa line have clarified the continuing relevance of motive and opportunity.
See, e.g., In re Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp.2d at 1107 ("[M]otive and opportunity ... in some
cases ...may be sufficiently strong standing alone."); Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp.2d at 1359 ("[I]n
occasional cases the inference drawn solely from motive and opportunity allegations will ...
be sufficiently strong to withstand a motion to dismiss ...."); Malin, 17 F. Supp.2d at 1357
(approving statement in Baesa that "[i]n some cases [particulars regarding motive and oppor
tunity] may even be sufficient by themselves to [raise a strong inference of scienter] " (quot
ing In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242)).
30. One commentator takes the remarkable position that the Reform Act simultaneously
codified the Second Circuit tests and refrained from imposing any presumption either for or
against the motive and opportunity test - a conclusion that essentially endorses both
Marksman and Baesa. Michael B.Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 193, 250 (1998) ("De
ciding courts ... may ...apply both of [the Second Circuit's] tests unaltered; they may ...
eliminat[e] the presumption that pleading motive and opportunity suffices to establish a
strong inference and measure the weight of such evidence on a case-by-case basis; or alterna
tively, they may develop novel requirements and tests by which to satisfy the strong inference
pleading standard."). Rather than concluding that virtually any reading of the Reform Act
other than Silicon Graphics must be correct, this Note will argue that the Silicon Graphics
court was at least correct on one point: the Congress unambiguously did not leave the door
open for rote application of the Second Circuit tests.
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the ultimate question of whether or not a plaintiff has raised a
strong inference of scienter. The Baesa rule serves the heuristic
function of reminding courts that the standard is central and the
tests are peripheral; the formalism of the tests cannot be allowed to
distract attention from the ultimate inquiry mandated by the stan
dard. Part I argues, contrary to Marksman, that while the Reform
Act codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, it did not cod
ify the associated tests. Part II argues, contrary to Silicon Graphics,
that the Reform Act also did not repudiate those tests or prohibit
courts from using them. Part III then embraces the Baesa rule, ar
guing that the same plain language and legislative history argu
ments that undercut both the Marksman and the Silicon Graphics
rules compel the Baesa rule.
I.

CONGRESS DID NOT CODIFY EITHER THE MOTIVE AND
OPPORTUNITY TEST OR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS TEST

Although Congress did codify the Second Circuit's pleading
standard, it did not codify either the motive and opportunity test or
the circumstantial evidence of recklessness test. This Part rejects
the Marksman rule, which holds that the Reform Act's adoption of
the Second Circuit's pleading standard implicitly codified both the
motive and opportunity test and the circumstantial evidence of
recklessness test.31 Section I.A contends that the plain language of
the Reform Act, as well as much of its legislative history, indicates
codification of only the pleading standard, not the tests. Section I.B
points out that the deletion of Senator Specter's amendment (which
would have expressly codified a simplistic version of the Second
Circuit's tests) by the Conference Committee conclusively refutes
the Marksman rule.
A.

The Reform Act Merely Codifi.ed the Second Circuit's
Pleading Standard

The Reform Act on its face codifies the Second Circuit's plead
ing standard. The Reform Act demands that plaintiffs "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with [scienter],"32 while the Second Circuit formerly de
manded that "facts alleged in the complaint must 'give[ ] ... rise to
31. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309-11, 1313
{C.D. Cal. 1996).
32. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D{b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
(Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
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a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent."'33 This similarity is not
accidental according to the legislative history.34 The Senate Report
denied adopting "a new and untested pleading standard that would
generate additional litigation," and conceded that the standard in
the draft legislation was "modeled upon the pleading standard of
the Second Circuit."35
The fact that the Reform Act codified the pleading standard
does not, however, prove that the Act also codified the tests. Sec
tion 21D(b)(2) says nothing about the tests.36 If the Reform Act
codified those tests, one might reasonably expect them to appear
somewhere in the statute, yet they are conspicuously absent. The
Conference Committee report recognizes this deliberate omission
when it emphasizes that "[t]he Conference Committee language is
based in part on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit," and
"[the Committee] does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard."37 The report's repu
diation of the Marksman rule is compelling because the Supreme
Court has identified conference committee reports as "the authori
tative source for finding the Legislature's intent"38 in part because
they are the only documents that involve the collective understand
ing of both houses of Congress.39 Furthermore, the legislative his
tory outside of the Conference Committee report is essentially a
wash, with comments from the Act's sponsors specifically disclaim33. In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (alteration in origi
nal) (emphasis added) (quoting O'Brien v. Natl. Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674,
676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
34. Legislative history is particularly essential when, as here, the plain text of the statute
is remarkably sparse and the text itself adopts a judicially constructed standard. Contempo
rary criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding, legislative history remains an appropriate aid
to statutory construction. For a comprehensive review and response to criticisms of judicial
use of legislative history, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpret
ing Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1991).
35. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; see also 141
CONG. REc. S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[T]he legislation
adopts the [S]econd [C]ircuit pleading standard . . . .").
36. See Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[H]ad Congress wished
to adopt the 'motive and opportunity' prong of the Second Circuit standard, it would have
said so.").
37. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41.
38. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
39. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 76 (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). Note
that the Conference Committee Report trumps floor debates. The Court has "eschewed reli
ance on the passing comments of one Member [of Congress] and casual statements from the
floor debates" in favor of the Conference Report. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 76 (citation omitted).
Further, the Conference Committee Report trumps the House and Senate reports. See
Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Because the conference report
represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses, next to the statute itself it is
the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent.").
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ing codification of the Second Circuit's tests40 balancing out any
comments consistent with the Marksman rule.41 Finally, the fact
that the Congress fully intended the Second Circuit's case law to be
available for reference, not as binding statutory authority but as in
structive persuasive authority,42 accounts for most pro Marksman
comments.
-

B.

The Deletion of Senator Specter's Proposed Amendment
Conclusively Proves That the Reform Act Did Not
Codify the Second Circuit's Tests

Any inference that the Second Circuit's tests were codified by
implication43 is disproven by the specific deletion of Senator
Specter's proposed amendment. The Supreme Court has held that
when a conference committee explicitly considers and then rejects
text - for example, by deleting a portion of a bill in conference that consideration and rejection is compelling evidence of legisla
tive intent and precludes interpretations that would reach the de
leted result by implication.44 This rule is precisely applicable to the
Reform Act.
40. See 141 CoNG. REc. S19,149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley)
("In fact, the language of the bill does codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard in part - and
the statement of managers says so. . . . [T]he conference report deliberately rejects a complete
codification of the [S]econd [C]ircuit and adopts language which is substantially similar to the
language in the Senate-passed bill . . . ." (emphasis added)); see also Memorandum from
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest of the Stanford Law School and former Commissioner of the
SE C to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 19, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. Sl9,067-68
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Grundfest memorandum] ("As I read the securities
litigation conference report, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test.
Indeed, I concur with the decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was
an incomplete and inaccurate codification of case law in the circuit.").
41. For example, Representative Lofgren essentially endorsed the Marksman result dur
ing the veto override debates. See 141 CONG. REc. H15,219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (state
ment of Rep. Lofgren). Senator Dodd reached a similar conclusion during the Senate
override debates. See 141 CONG. REc. S17,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dodd). Although both Lofgren and Dodd spoke of the Second Circuit's standard, their com
ments are typically taken (at least by plaintiffs' lawyers) as support for the Marksman rule.
See, e.g., Appellants' Opening Brief at 42, 43 n.20, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., (9th Cir.
1997) (No. 97-16240).
42. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C. C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The
Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading
standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.").
43. See, e.g., In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June
17, 1999) ("We believe Congress's use of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclu
sion that the Reform Act establishes a pleading standard approximately equal in stringency
to that of the Second Circuit."); Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (inferring incorporation of the tests from Congress's decision "to incorporate verbatim
the language of the Second Circuit Rule 9(b) standard").
44. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1986) ("Few principles of statutory
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub
silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
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The Senate version of the Reform Act, S. 240, included an
amendment originally proposed by Senator Specter. The Specter
amendment would have replaced section 21D(b)(2) with the
following:

(b) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND. (1) IN GENERAL.
[T]he complaint shall . . .specifi
cally allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
(2) STRONG INFERENCE OF FRAUDULENT INTENT. - For
purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind may be
established either (A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud;
or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circum
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reck
lessness by the defendant.45
- •

•

•

Subparagraph (2)(A) would have codified the motive and opportu
nity test and subparagraph (2)(B) would have codified the circum
stantial evidence of recklessness test. The Specter amendment
passed the Senate, and was part of the bill that the Senate sent to
the Conference Committee. The Conference Committee removed
the amendment,46 compelling the conclusion that they did not in
tend to codify the Second Circuit's tests by implication.
The sponsors of the bill explained their intention in removing
the Specter amendment. In the floor debates on the Conference
Committee Report, Senator Specter inquired about the disappear
ance of his amendment, and Senator Dodd (one of the bill's manag
ers) explained the Conference Committee's rationale:

Basically, what we intended to do here was to codify the [S]econd
[C]ircuit's pleadings standards, not to indicate disapproval of each individual case that came before it.. . .
. . . [T]he Banking Committee .. . does not intend before we consider the bill to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's case law interpreting
this pleading standard, although courts may find this body [of] law
instructive.47
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (holding that a conference committee's deletion of a phrase
from a bill that is later passed "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a
result that it expressly declined to enact"); see also Brief of the American Electronics
Association, Amicus Curiae at 12, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 9716240).
45. 141 CONG. REc. S9,170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (Amendment No. 1485).
46. See 141 CoNG. REc. Sl7,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)
("The conference report struck out the language which my amendment had inserted which
would have given guidance to how plaintiffs could meet that very stringent standard.").
47. 141 CoNG. REc. Sl7,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (emphasis
added). Following the quoted language, Senator Dodd also explained that:
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Senator Dodd expressly confirms the obvious inference - the
Conference Committee did not intend to codify Senator Specter's
articulation of the Second Circuit's tests, and therefore removed
language that would have done so, leaving only language that codi
fies the "strong inference of scienter" standard.48
* * *

The Reform Act did not codify either the Second Circuit's mo
tive and opportunity test or circumstantial evidence of recklessness
test. The plain text of the Act and its legislative history make that
clear, as does the deletion of the Specter amendment.

II.

CONGRESS DID NOT REPUDIATE EITHER THE MOTIVE AND
OPPORTUNITY TEST OR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS TEST

Although not codified by the Reform Act, the Second Circuit's
tests may still guide courts in their case-by-case evaluations of
plaintiffs' pleadings. The Silicon Graphics court held that the mo
tive and opportunity test and the circumstantial evidence of reck
lessness test were repudiated by the Reform Act, with the result
that plaintiffs must plead circumstantial evidence of conscious
wrongdoing.49 This argument typically relies upon footnote 23 in
the Statement of Managers, which states that "the Conference
Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain lan
guage relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."50 This Part
The Senator's amendment adopted the guidance of the [S]econd [C]ircuit, but the
amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualification in
the case law. The courts have held that "where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may
plead scienter by identifying circumstances" indicating wrongful behavior, but "the
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater" from the
number of cases.
141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). In other words,
the rationale for removing Senator Specter's amendment was that the amendment failed to
clarify the full effect that the presence or absence of motive and opportunity has upon a
plaintiff's showing. The Committee did not reason that motive and opportunity are now
irrelevant - to the contrary, the Specter amendment failed to capture the full extent to
which motive and opportunity are relevant.
48. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999)
("[I]f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for
scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact
that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti
mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation.");
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 997-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20
(9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same
point).
49. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (holding that the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to "allege specific facts
that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants").
50. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 48 n.23. The Statement of Managers is the
Conference Committee Report for the Reform Act. For examples of reliance upon footnote
23 for the proposition that the Reform Act raised the pleading standard above that of the
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rejects the Silicon Graphics rule. Section II.A argues that the plain
language of the statute and the contemporaneous legislative history
support the proposition that the Second Circuit's tests have not
been repudiated by the Reform Act. Section II.B then turns to sub
sequent legislative history for additional evidence that the Second
Circuit's tests retain some viability. Finally, section II.C concludes
that complete rejection of the Second Circuit's tests would undercut
the policy goals of the Reform Act.
A. The Plain Language of the Statute Read with the
Contemporaneous Legislative History Demonstrates the
Survival of the Second Circuit's Tests
Since the Reform Act fails to present any interpretation of the
strong inference standard that might replace the Second Circuit's
tests,51 the most natural inference is that it at least permits the use
of the Second Circuit's tests.52 There is a significant contrary indi
cation in the legislative history, however, because the Statement of
Managers explains that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not
intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard."53 After that sentence, the Managers appended
footnote 23, which stated that mention of motive and opportunity
and recklessness had been omitted.54 Courts that follow the Silicon
Graphics rule often rely on footnote 23.55 These courts are
incorrect.
Footnote 23 should not be read as repudiating the Second
Circuit's tests because Congress did not intend the Reform Act to
change the substantive law of scienter but rather intended it to
change the procedure through which plaintiffs plead scienter.56
Second Circuit, see Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *6-7; Message to the House of
Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2210, 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton Veto
Message].
51. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (inferring support for
the Second Circuit's tests from the absence of any alternative articulated in the Reform Act).
52. See Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("That
Congress chose to incorporate verbatim the language of the Second Circuit Rule 9(b) stan
dard is a strong indication of its intent to enact in § 78u-4(b)(2) a pleading standard of ap
proximately the same specificity.").
53. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41.
54. See id. at 48 n.23.
55. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL
446521, at *5 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing footnote 23 and accompanying text for the propo
sition that "the joint committee expressly rejected the Second Circuit's two prong test").
56. This Note uses the label "substantive" to refer to the plaintiff's burdens at trial, and
uses the term "procedural" to refer to the plaintiff 's burdens of pleading. Tue distinction is
highly relevant, see Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 698 (distinguishing "whether scienter has
been shown" from the "very different question" of "whether plaintiffs' complaint adequately
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Section 21D(b)(2) specifies that a pleading must give rise to a
strong inference of "the required state of mind" - a phrase that
necessarily incorporates the scienter requirements of the underlying
substantive law.57 This means that Congress sought only to change
the pleading standard, not the underlying substantive law, with
§ 21D(b)(2).
Because every circuit court to consider the question has held
that recklessness suffices substantively (to prove liability)S8 it would
be anomalous to read footnote 23 as prohibiting plaintiffs from
pleading recklessness, thereby imposing a higher burden on plain
tiffs at the pleading stage (before discovery) than they would bear
at trial (after discovery).59 One might argue that Congress intended
to change the substantive securities law "through the back door"
and merely chose to pursue that goal through procedural reform in
order to avoid the political difficulty of appearing to be "pro
securities fraud."60 As Chairman Levitt has suggested, however, it
pleads scienter"), because the Reform Act changed only the pleading requirement, not the
substantive law defining various securities fraud offenses.
For discussion of this distinction in subsequent legislative history, see S. REP. No. 105-182,
at 5-6 (1998) (clarifying that Congress did not intend the Reform Act to change the substan
tive scienter requirement); 144 CoNG. REc. S4,798-99 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Dodd) (affirming that he did not intend the Reform Act to alter the substantive scienter
requirement). Cf. Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 & n.2 (N.D.
Tex. 1998) (noting that the Reform Act "by its own terms, does nothing to alter the level of
intent previously required" and "clearly does not attempt to supply a specific level of intent,
but refers the reader to whichever cause of action in the Securities and Exchange Act a
plaintiff brings suit").
57. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the
definition of "required state of mind" must necessarily come from the Exchange Act or the
underlying common law); see also Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 18, In re Silicon
Graphics Sec. Litig., {9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-16240) [hereinafter SEC Brief].
58. The Supreme Court reserved opinion on whether recklessness sufficed substantively
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). Every circuit court of appeals
to consider the question, however, has found recklessness sufficient under Rule lOb-5. See
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane)
(collecting cases). Even the Fourth Circuit essentially accepts recklessness. It has twice held,
albeit both times in unpublished opinions, that severe recklessness suffices to satisfy the sci·
enter requirement imposed in Ernst & Ernst. See SEC v. Gotchey, 981 F.2d 1251, 1992 WL
385284 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that "severe recklessness satisfies scienter requirement" (cita
tion omitted)); Kessler v. Falbo (In re Hughes Creek, Inc.), 980 F.2d 727, 1992 WL 301956
{4th Cir. 1992) (same).
59. See SEC Brief, supra note 57, at 19; David M. Lavine & Adam C. Pritchard, The
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky
Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1, 35 (1998) ("It would hardly make sense to find recklessness insuffi
cient at the pleading stage, but sufficient to impose liability."); see also SEC REPORT, supra
note 3, at 41 (noting that an interpretation of § 21D{b)(2) that prohibited pleadings of reck
lessness would also eliminate recklessness as a basis of liability).
60. This argument would note that "[t]he Reform Act revised both the substantive stan
dards and procedural rules governing private actions." Implementation of the Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazard·
ous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
Act Hearing] (statement of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman). Chairman Levitt has described
cases raising the pleading standard as "indirectly [affecting] the substantive liability require-
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is unlikely that this was Congress's intent,61 and courts should not
assume duplicity on the part of the legislature in the face of a clear,
textual command and even clearer legislative history. Moreover,
the safe harbor provision, which protects certain classes of reckless
statements, would be superfluous if recklessness were not within
the scope of the Reform Act. Footnote 23 lists motive and opportu
nity and recklessness all in the same sentence: "For this reason, the
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."62
That sentence cannot mean one thing for the first two elements in
the clause ("motive, opportunity") and something entirely different
for the third element ("recklessness"). Footnote 23 is an
all-or-nothing affair: if it does not prohibit the recklessness test, it
cannot prohibit the motive and opportunity test either.
A comparison between the scienter pleading provision of the
Reform Act and the safe harbor provision further proves that
Congress did not intend footnote 23 to imply an "actual knowl
edge" standard. In the safe harbor provision, Congress expressly
requires a showing of "actual knowledge . . . that the statement was
false or misleading."63 The stark absence of any similar language in
§ 21D(b)(2) strongly implies that Congress did not intend
§ 21D(b)(2) to require "actual knowledge."64 The contrast with the
safe-harbor provision also goes to show that the Reform Act could
not have been meant to compel strict adherence to the Second
Circuit's tests.Gs
ments of the securities laws themselves." 1997 Act Hearing, supra, at 23 (statement of Arthur
Levitt). If one were prone to believe that the Silicon Graphics line of cases is correct, one
could believe that Congress intended to change indirectly the substantive liability require
ments - in other words, to change the substantive securities law through the back door.
One might defend that argument by suggesting that the political difficulties associated with
overtly sanctioning securities fraud might compel Congress to approach the substantive law
through the vehicle of procedure.
61. 1997 Act Hearing, supra note 60, at 23 (statement of Arthur Levitt).
62. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 48 n.23.
63. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A(c)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1997). Tue safe harbor provision provides, inter alia, that certain
classes of forward-looking statements are generally not subject to liability if they prove to be
false or misleading. Liability for such statements will only be imposed upon a showing that
the statement "was made with actual knowledge by [the person making the statement] that
the statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B).
64. See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("Congress knew well how to state [a 'knowing misbehavior'] standard. . . . Tue Court finds
the omission of such language in the statute significant . . . ." ) (citation omitted).
65. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521
at *20 (9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Moreover, the Spec
ter Amendment's codification of a specific test for pleading scienter would have been incon
sistent with the provisions of the Reform Act requiring a different state of mind for different
statements. Under the Reform Act's 'save harbor' provisions, plaintiffs must prove that 'for
ward-looking' statements were made with 'actual knowledge' that they were false or mislead
ing.
. A recklessness standard for pleading that would apply to all statements, such as that
• .
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Footnote 23 should instead be understood as a reference to the
Specter amendment.66 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion to the con
tary notwithstanding,67 the conclusion that Congress deliberately
declined to codify Senator Specter's articulation of the tests does
not entail the conclusion that they affirmatively rejected all use of
the Second Circuit case law.68 In fact, as Senator Dodd explained,
one rationale for rejecting the Specter amendment was that it failed
to capture the full detail and sophistication of the contemporary
Second Circuit case law.69 Numerous statements in the legislative
history to the effect that courts may find the Second Circuit's case
law instructive70 indicate that removal of the Specter amendment
did not constitute a conclusive rejection of the Second Circuit's
tests.
proposed in the Specter Amendment, would have been inconsistent with the safe harbor's
requirement of 'actual knowledge' for forward-looking statements." (citation omitted)).
66. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210; SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 29
{identifying footnote 23 as an explanation of the deletion of the Specter amendment).
67. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at
*4 {9th Cir. July 2, 1999) (citing as evidence of a raised standard, the fact that "Congress
declined to enact an amendment that would have adopted the Second Circuit rule").
68. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1999 WL 446521, at *20 {Browning, J., concurring and dis
senting) {"The legislative history suggests, however, that the Committee rejected language
added by the Specter Amendment because it was 'an incomplete and inaccurate codification'
of Second Circuit case law, not because the Committee intended to restrict the ways in which
a 'strong inference' of scienter might be shown. Indeed, supporters of the defeated Specter
Amendment were assured that while the Reform Act did not expressly provide that plaintiffs
could plead scienter based on recklessness or motive and opportunity to defraud, 'the gui
dance [provided by Second Circuit case law] is still going to be there."' (citation omitted));
OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 {W.D.N.Y. 1997) {"Simply because
Congress did not codify that case law by making those factors an express part of the pleading
standard does not mean that Congress intended to overturn that case law."). It is noteworthy
that the Specter amendment would have codified the "strong circumstantial evidence of con
scious misbehavior" standard alongside the recklessness and motive and opportunity stan
dards. See 141 CoNG.REc. S9,170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) {Amendment No. 1485). Yet the
same courts that see the Specter amendment as decisive on the question of whether reckless
ness or motive and opportunity survived do not hold that "circumstantial evidence of con
scious misbehavior" was prohibited as well. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 40 {"This
conclusion was reached [by Judge Smith in Silicon Graphics] despite the fact that in deleting
the clarifying amendment, the Conference Committee deleted not only the language regard
ing motive, opportunity, and recklessness, but also the language regarding conscious
misbehavior.").
69. 141 CoNG. REc. S17,960 {daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (stating
that "the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania completely omits a critical qualifica
tion in the case law [namely that] 'where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead scien
ter by identifying circumstances' indicating wrongful behavior, but 'the strength of the
circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater"').
In later debates, Senator Dodd made clear that the removal of the Specter amendment
ought not be interpreted as prohibition of the Second Circuit's tests. See 141 CONG. REc.
S19,071 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (explaining that even after the removal of the
Specter amendment, the guidance provided by Second Circuit case law will still be available
to courts).
70. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 {1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
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President Clinton's veto message, which asserted that the
Reform Act set the standard so far above the Second Circuit level
as to bar too many meritorious claims,71 does not compel a contrary
result, because the post-veto debates override the veto message.72
President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act because he interpreted
footnote 23 and the accompanying text, along with the removal of
the Specter amendment, as evidence of a pleading standard higher
than the Second Circuit's.73 The Supreme Court, however, has ex
pressed significant skepticism about reliance on the comments of a
bill's opponents as legislative history, on the grounds that such op
ponents tend to "overstate [the bill's] reach."74 The Court has
therefore held that it is not the "fears and doubts of the opposition"
to which one looks when interpreting a statute, but rather the spon
sors,75 who in this case said that President Clinton overestimated
the import of footnote 23.76 For example, in the veto override de
bate, Senator Domenici inserted a bill summary stating that the ob
jective of section 21D(b) (2) was "[t]o codify the requirements in the
[Second] Circuit."77 Other comments by nonsponsor supporters
make the same point.78 President Clinton himself appears to have
recently recanted the main points in the veto message, suggesting
that even he now concurs that the original veto message misstated
the reach of the Reform Act.79
71. Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210.
72. See NLRB v. Robbins Trre & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235 (1978). But see Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 255-56 (1994) (relying on veto as guide to legislative intent
when Congress failed to override veto of bill with retroactivity provision, but succeeded in
passing and obtaining signature of identical bill without retroactivity provision).
73. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210 ("[T]he conferees make crystal clear
in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond [the Second
Circuit's]. I am not prepared to accept that.").
74. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); accord Shell
Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co.,
453 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
394 (1951)).
75. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at
394).
76. See 141 CoNG. REc. S19,150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici)
("The President objected to the pleading standard. Yet it is the Second Circuit's pleading
standard.").
77. 141 CoNG. REc. Sl9,151 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
78. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. H15,219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Lofgren) ("The President says he supports the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard for pleading. So
do I. That is what is included in this bill.").
79. See Statement on Signing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 34
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2247, 2248 (Nov. 3, 1998) ("In signing the Uniform Standards

Act, I do so with the understanding . . . that investors with legitimate complaints meeting the
Second Circuit pleading standard will have access to our Nation's courts. . . . the Statement of
Managers confirms that the Second Circuit pleading standard will be the uniform standard
for pleading securities fraud.").
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Subsequent Legislative History Confirms the Survival of the
Second Circuit's Tests

In the legislative history for the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Congress clarified the intended meaning of
the Reform Act.80 This subsequent legislative history, while not
controlling, is entitled to some persuasive weight. In response to
the Silicon Graphics line of cases, the Uniform Standards Act
Conference Report directly states that Congress did not intend to
remove recklessness as a basis of liability under Rule lOb-5. The
necessary implication is that the Reform Act was not intended to
prohibit pleading recklessness.
Subsequent legislative history deserves weight in the interpre
tive process, even though it lacks both the force of law and of con
temporaneous legislative history.81 Subsequent legislative history is
at its most relevant when courts have based decisions on legislative
history and Congress has then reviewed the same materials and
drawn an opposite conclusion.82
Precisely such a review and clarification has occurred with re
spect to the Reform Act: the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 arose out of legislative hearings on the ef
fects of the Reform Act. Congress heard testimony that a primary
result of the Reform Act was to drive lawsuits from federal court
into state court, to evade the strict federal pleading standard. The
80. Note that the "uniformity" referred to in the title of the Act is uniformity across the
federal-state line. The purpose of the Uniform Standards Act is to preempt certain state
securities fraud class action lawsuits, thereby preventing plaintiffs from circumventing the
Reform Act by shifting to state courts. See id. at 2248. The Uniform Standards Act does not
purport to legislate away the nonuniformity across the federal circuits.
81. The Advanta court declined to give the subsequent legislative history any weight at
all. See In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 998-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *6 (3d Cir. June 17,
1999) ("[O]ur interpretation of the Reform Act is unaffected by the legislative history of the
Standards Act."). While the Advanta court correctly cited Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) for the point that the "interpretation
given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute," courts should nevertheless not dismiss
subsequent legislative history entirely. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 687 n.7 (1979) (acknowledging rule that subsequent legislative history does not control,
but stating that courts are remiss to ignore it completely); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (approving Cannon).
82. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion)
(endorsing the use of subsequent legislative history in construing legislation "[e]specially . . ,
when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate the historical
materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary conclusion"). The Glidden Court
equates subsequent legislative history with subsequent interpretive legislation: "'I)'pical is a
statement in the 1958 House Report . . . . Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of
an earlier law . . . is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction." 370
U.S. at 541 (internal question marks and citations omitted). To the extent that such an equiv
ocation is plausible, other Supreme Court precedents approve the use of subsequent legisla·
tion as an interpretive aid. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974);
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969); FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S.
84, 90 (1958).
.
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Senate therefore initiated the Uniform Standards Act to raise the
bar in state court.83 During the debate over the Uniform Standards
Act, the SEC expressed concern that it might lock in erroneous dis
trict court holdings that rejected recklessness as a basis for pleading
scienter.84 The Conference Committee addressed this concern by
stating that "the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in
this legislation is that neither the Reform Act nor S. 1260 in any
way alters the scienter standard in Federal securities fraud suits."85
This passage attempts to remove any ambiguity surrounding the
purpose of the Reform Act: Congress did not intend the Reform
Act to change the underlying liability rules. The clear implication is
that the pleading standard should not be interpreted so as to elimi
nate recklessness as a method of pleading securities fraud. If reck
lessness was not eliminated, neither was the motive and opportunity
test,86 and the Second Circuit's interpretation of the pleading stan
dard remains viable even under the Reform Act.

83. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998).

84. See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC and Commissioners Isaac C.
Hunt, Jr. and Laura S. Unger to Senators Alfonse M. D'Amato, Phil Gra=, and
Christopher Dodd (Mar.24, 1998) ("[W]hen the Commission testified ... we stated that a
uniform standard for securities fraud class actions that did not permit investors to recover
losses attributable to reckless misconduct would jeopardize the integrity of the securities
markets. In light of this profound concern, we were gratified by the language in your letter of
today agreeing to restate in S. 1260's legislative history, and in the expected debate on the
Senate floor, that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 did not, and was not
intended to, alter the well-recognized and critically important scienter standard."); 1997 Act
Hearing, supra note 60 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman) ("The Commission was
able to support S. 1260 only upon receiving assurances that legislative history would be in
serted into the record making clear that the Reform Act was not meant to define or alter the
state of mind requirements for securities fraud liability.").
85. S. REP. No. 105-182 at 3-4 (1998) (Statement of Managers - The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998). Similar language is found in the Senate Report.
See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998) ("It was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated
during the legislative debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate on overriding
the President's veto, that the PSLRA establish a uniform federal standard on pleading re
quirements by adopting the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Ap
peals."). A colloquy on the Senate floor between Senators Dodd and D'Amato (both
sponsors of the Reform Act) made the same point, and explained that footnote 23 should not
be interpreted to the contrary.See 144 CONG.REc. S4,798-99 (daily ed.May 13, 1998) (collo
quy between Sen. Dodd and Sen. D'Amato) (reiterating that neither sponsor intended the
Reform Act to raise the bar above the Second Circuit level and confirming that footnote 23
was intended merely to account for the omission of the Specter amendment). On the House
side, Representatives Eshoo and Cox (both sponsors of the Reform Act) engaged in a paral
lel colloquy, which concluded with Representative Cox's statement that "[i]t is my clear un
derstanding that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter standards of
liability under the Exchange Act." 144 CONG.REc. H6,061 (daily ed.July 21, 1998) (colloquy
between Rep.Eshoo and Rep. Cox).
86. See supra note 59.
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The Policy Rationales Underlying the Reform Act Require
Retention of the Second Circuit's Tests

Protection of investors and investor confidence is "the overrid
ing purpose of our Nation's securities laws," and the purpose of the
Reform Act.s7 Investors (and by extension, investor confidence)
are protected by the deterrent value of private enforcement of the
securities laws. If the scienter pleading standard were raised to cir
cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing, that deterrent value
would diminish:

Ensuring that the scienter standard includes reckless misconduct is
critical to investor protection. Creating a higher scienter standard
would lessen the incentives for issuers of securities to conduct a full
inquiry into potentially troublesome areas and could therefore dam
age the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for
other nations. The U.S. securities markets are the envy of the world
precisely because investors at home and abroad have enormous confi
dence in the way our markets operate. Altering the scienter standard
in the way envisioned by some of these district court decisions could
be very damaging to that confidence.ss
While the Reform Act focuses on decreasing securities lawsuits,
that is only because Congress believed that the pendulum had
swung too far toward securities fraud plaintiffs.s9 An interpretation
of the Reform Act that raised the bar too high would be inconsis
tent with the balance that Congress intended the Reform Act to
strike. Complete prohibition of motive and opportunity pleadings
would be inconsistent in precisely this fashion, because it would al
most certainly preclude some legitimate complaints.90 Permitting
recklessness and motive and opportunity to play some role in secur
ities fraud litigation helps protect investors and maintain confidence
by exposing fraudulent schemes that might withstand scrutiny
under a more defense-oriented test.
* * *

Therefore, just as the Reform Act does not codify the Second
Circuit's tests, it also does not prohibit their use. Put differently,
the Reform Act rejects both per se approaches, Marksman and
Silicon Graphics. Under the Reform Act, recklessness is neither
per se sufficient nor per se insufficient (lest the rule thwart the con
sensus of every Circuit Court of Appeals that recklessness generally
87.

Statement of Managers, supra note

88. 144 CoNG. REc. S4,798

4,

at

(daily ed. May

31.

13, 1998)

(statement of Sen. Dodd).

89.

Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31 (" Congress has been prompted by signifi
cant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors and
maintain confidence in our capital markets.").

90. See

Clinton Veto Message, supra note

50,

at
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suffices to establish liability under Rufo lOb-5).91 Subsequent legis
lative history has made clear that Congress did not intend to change
the substantive law of scienter: in other words, they did not intend
to overturn the consensus of the circuits. The treatment of motive
and opportunity tracks the treatment of recklessness - pleading
motive and opportunity is neither per se sufficient nor per se insuffi
cient. The need to maintain confidence in the securities market
also supports the availability of the Second Circuit's tests.
III. CONGRESS LEFT COURTS TO DECIDE ON A CASE-BY-CASE
BASIS WHETHER pARTICULAR SHOWINGS OF MOTIVE AND
OPPORTUNITY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RECKLESSNESS
GIVE RISE TO A STRONG INFERENCE OF SCIENTER
A small cadre of federal district courts has consistently held that
the Reform Act codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, a
result that is logical given the plain text of section 21D(b)(2), but
not the Second Circuit's tests interpreting that standard.92 This Part
argues that these courts, led by In re Baesa Securities Litigation, are
correct. The Reform Act essentially shifts the locus of uncertainty
in federal securities fraud lawsuits. In the pre-Reform Act Second
Circuit, and in post-Reform Act Marksman courts, the courts com
pare a plaintiff's pleading with an ideal motive and opportunity
pleading or an ideal recklessness pleading. The question becomes
"is this allegation of motive and opportunity or recklessness suffi
ciently specific and particular to give the test any teeth?" The
Reform Act shifts the locus of uncertainty from the test itself to the
antecedent and ultimately terminal question "has the plaintiff
raised a strong inference of scienter?" Section III.A contends that
the plain language of the statute and the legislative history dictate
this interpretation. Section III.B demonstrates that the Baesa rule
also best effectuates the policy goals of the Reform Act.

91. If recklessness is sufficient to establish liability, recklessness must also be a sufficient
pleading. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Tue alternative, requiring a higher stan

dard for pleading than for a showing of liability, requires one to believe that Congress in
tended covertly to change the liability standard, a conclusion that courts should not accept.
See text accompanying supra notes 60-61.
92. See Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Queen Uno Ltd.
Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998); In re
Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998); In re Health Man
agement, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Baesa Sec. Litig.,
969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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The Baesa Rule Flows Directly from the Plain Language of
the Reform Act, and Is Supported by the
Legislative History

The Baesa rule is relatively simple: courts must conduct a fresh
examination of each plaintiff's allegations, without regard to "for
malistic categor[ies]" such as recklessness or motive and opportu
nity, to determine whether a strong inference of scienter is raised.93
The Baesa court observed that section 21D(b)(2) merely adopts the
strong inference standard but stops short of endorsing any particu
lar method of raising a strong inference.94 The court then explained
that:

The conclusion follows from the plain language of the statute that the
mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of itself, automati
cally suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter.
This, of course, does not mean that particulars regarding motive
and opportunity may not be relevant to pleading circumstances from
which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred. In
some cases, they may even be sufficient by themselves to do so. But,
under the Reform Act, and in contrast to prior Second Circuit prece
dent, they are not presumed sufficient to do so. Rather, under the
Reform Act formulation, the pleadings must set forth sufficient par
ticulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the required
scienter.95
The key to the Baesa rule is its refusal to determine the outcome of
a motion to dismiss based on "formalistic categor[ies] such as mo
tive and opportunity."96 Under the Baesa rule, recklessness or mo
tive and opportunity are presumed neither sufficient nor
insufficient. Further, those categories do not exhaust a plaintiff's
potential options: just as a plaintiff might make a recklessness
showing or a motive and opportunity showing that was sufficient to
raise a strong inference of scienter, a plaintiff could also "impress[ ]
upon the court a novel legal theory."97 The sole inquiry under this
approach is the strong inference standard, and the court declines to
take shortcuts by presuming either recklessness or motive and op
portunity to be per se sufficient or per se necessary.98
The Baesa rule follows from the language of the Reform Act.
Congress codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard, but ex
pressly refrained from codifying the Second Circuit's tests interpret
ing the standard. The inevitable conclusion is that courts must
93.
94.
95.
96.

Supp. 2d at 1359.
969 F. Supp. at 242.
969 F. Supp. at 242 (footnotes omitted).
Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
97. In re Health Management, 970 F. Supp. at 201.
98. See Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; see also Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d
1345, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
Queen Uno,

2

F.

See In re Baesa,
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examine a plaintiff's showings to determine if they meet the strong
inference standard.99 The Reform Act, "while adopting the 'strong
inference' requirement, makes no mention whatever of 'motive and
opportunity,' nor singles out any other special kind of particulars as
presumptively sufficient. "100 The Reform Act also does not single
out any "special kind of particulars" as presumptively insufficient.
Thus, the Baesa rule merely asks courts to "appl[y] the statute as
written,'' under which "allegations of motive, opportunity, or reck
less behavior may still be relevant. "101
The Baesa rule is consistent with the key elements from the leg
islative history that the Silicon Graphics court relied on. These ele
ments all demonstrate that the Second Circuit's tests were
deliberately omitted from the legislation. 102 The Baesa rule is con
sistent with this point, because it does not give either recklessness
or motive and opportunity presumptive weight. The Silicon
Graphics rule also relies on citations to the legislative history tend
ing to demonstrate that Congress intended to raise the overall bar
for pleading scienter nationally, which would require raising the bar
in the Second Circuit.103 The Baesa rule is consistent with this point
as well: under the Baesa rule, courts in the Second Circuit may no
longer permit a pleading to survive as a matter of law merely
because it contains allegations of recklessness or motive and oppor
tunity. Instead, they must find that those allegations are sufficient
to raise a strong inference of scienter on those facts. This raises the
99. In re Advanta Sec. Litig., No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997, at *7 (3d Cir. June 17, 1999)
("[I]f Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for
scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our view, the fact
that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of cases, but ulti
mately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation.");
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig. Nos. 97-16204 & 97-16240, 1999 WL 446521, at *20 (9th
Cir. July 2, 1999) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Advanta for the same
point).
100. In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
101. OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 89 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); accord
Myles v. Midcom Co=unications, Inc., No. C96-614D (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 1996) ("The
statute itself defines the standard and the statute is clear."), discussed in SEC REPORT, supra
note 3, at 44.
102. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 756 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (citing the Statement of Managers for the proposition that the Conference Committee
deliberately chose not to include references to recklessness or motive and opportunity in the
pleading standard).
103. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics 1996 WL 664639, at *6 n.4 ("The Court finds that the
legislative history, the most definitive part of which is the Conference Committee Report,
establishes the SRA standard as stricter than the Second Circuit standard.").
Judge Smith drafted two opinions in Silicon Graphics. The first, 1996 WL 664639, at *1,
was the original hearing. The second, 970 F. Supp. at 746, responded to a renewed motion to
dismiss and a motion for su=ary judgment following plaintiffs' submission of an amended
complaint. For purposes of this Note, the two are functionally interchangeable, because
Judge Smith incorporated her prior holding as to the pleading standard in her second opin
ion. See Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754 ("After reviewing the arguments and the legal
authorities, the Court believes that its original interpretation was correct.").
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bar even in the Second Circuit,104 without demanding a showing of
conscious wrongdoing - the hurdle President Clinton rejected as
excessively prodefendant.
B.

The Baesa Rule Is Consistent with the Policies Underlying the
Reform Act

The Baesa rule effectuates the Reform Act's policy goals better
than either the Marksman rule or the Silicon Graphics rule. Section
III.B.1 argues that the case-by-case element of the Baesa rule pre
vents the kind of generic, "cookie-cutter" pleadings Congress
sought to avoid. Section III.B.2 concludes that the Baesa rule
avoids the Marksman problem of risking nonmeritorious litigation,
while also avoiding the Silicon Graphics problem of setting the bar
too high.
1.

The Baesa Rule Prevents "Cookie-Cutter" Complaints

The Baesa court's case-by-case approach prevents abusive
cookie-cutter complaints. Boilerplate litigation filed without inves
tigation into specific facts was one of Congress's central objections.
The House Report used the phrase "cookie-cutter complaints" to
refer to boilerplate claims filed within hours of a significant stock
movement.105 The Report cited the example of Philip Morris:

On April 2, 1993, Philip Morris announced that it would reduce the
average price of its cigarettes, and therefore, that it expected earnings
in the future to decline. Less than five hours later, the first of [ten]
lawsuits [in two days] were filed . . . . Two of the complaints con
tained identical allegations "that the defendants . . . engaged in con
duct to create and prolong the illusion of Philip Morris' success in the
toy industry." Apparently, these complaints are lodged in some com
puter bank of fraud complaints, available for quick access but without
much regard to accuracy.106
The case-by-case approach of the Baesa rule would control this
problem better than a per se rule. While judges will certainly scruti
nize complaints carefully under any rule, a generic complaint is
surely easier to draft under a per se rule that has endorsed one or
another formalistic test. A rule that mandates case-by-case analysis
should result in more detailed scrutiny of a plaintiff's allegations,
104. See In re

Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D. Nev. 1998).

105. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 16 (1995) (commenting that plaintiff's lawyers would
"file suit within hours or days" of a stock drop "citing a laundry list of cookie-cutter com
plaints"); see also 141 CoNG. REc. Sl9,064 {daily ed. Dec 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Faircloth) ("One law firm files a securities suit every 5 working days, one a week. They are
just churning them out, whether there is any validity or not. That is how much it takes to

meet the payroll, so they churn out one a week.").
106. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 16 (1995) (second omission in original) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
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compelling the plaintiff to put more detail and care into complaints,
with an attendant decrease in cookie-cutter complaints.107
Many Members of Congress regarded these boilerplate com
plaints as paradigm cases of abuse of the litigation process.108
Plaintiffs' lawyers designed the cookie-cutter complaint to track
language from the case law - the so-called magic words, in order
to survive a motion to dismiss with minimal actual evidence of
wrongdoing. Because 12(b)(6) motions must argue exclusively
from the pleadings, such complaints often permitted plaintiffs to get
to discovery. Once the plaintiffs got to discovery, they were able to
extract the coercive results Congress sought to avoid. By depriving
litigants of the "magic words" and thereby reducing boilerplate
complaints, the Baesa rule should check generic litigation before it
can develop into coercive settlements.
2.

The Baesa Rule Properly Balances the Competing Goals of
Minimizing Frivolous Litigation and Protecting Investors

The Baesa rule properly reconciles the need for recklessness
based liability in some cases with Congress's expressed intention to
shelter forward-looking statements. A rule that treats recklessness
as per se insufficient would undercut the Reform Act's goal of
"protect[ing] investors and [maintaining] confidence in the securi
ties markets. " 109 In an efficient market, misinformation directly
107. Complaints filed immediately subsequent to the Reform Act provide some support
for this claim. The SEC's Report to the President and the Congress found that, in the first
year after the Reform Act, "[m]ost securities class action complaints filed in federal court . . .
appear to contain detailed allegations specific to the action. Few appear to be cookie-cutter
complaints and a substantial majority include allegations beyond a mere failed forecast."
SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also id. at 22 ("[M]ost complaints [filed post-Reform
Act] do not have the type of glaring errors which would suggest that they were the product of
a hurried word processing 'cut-and-paste."'). It is reasonable to suspect that the Reform
Act's disruption of previously per se acceptable standards contributed to this increased
specificity.
108. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. S8,897 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) ("All the allegations are the same, case after case. . . . [T]hey always use the same
allegations and the same words. The lawyers just change the name of the company being
sued - it pops out of the computer."); 141 CoNG. REc. S8,894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dodd) ("No one lawyer could possibly have investigated the facts this
quickly."); 141 CoNG. REc. S8,911 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth)
(describing cookie-cutter complaints as "not lawsuits" but "legalized blackmail"); 141 CONG.
REc. S,8935 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grams) (complaining that cookie
cutter complaints "are rarely filed with any evidence of fraud or wrongdoing - in fact, they
are often filed simply with the knowledge that the value of a stock has dropped").
109. Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31; see also The Securities Litigation Uni
form Standards Act of 1997
S. 1260: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 45 (1997) [hereinafter S. 1260
Hearing] (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC Chairman and Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., SEC Com
-

missioner) ("The Commission strongly believes that recklessness must be preserved as the
standard for liability because it is essential to investor protection. . . . [Failing to] include
recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets,
and would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims.").
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and immediately distorts the market, regardless of the intentions of
the disseminator of the misinformation.11° Therefore, reckless dis
semination of misinformation undercuts the protection of investors
and the maintenance of confidence in the securities markets every
bit as much as conscious dissemination of misinformation. Civil lia
bility for recklessness encourages corporate officials to verify proac
tively the information they disseminate, while abolishing such
liability would create a perverse incentive for corporate officials to
"remain purposely ignorant. "111
Enforcing the motive and opportunity test as a per se sufficient
showing would undercut the Reform Act's goal of preventing frivo
lous and abusive litigation.112 Pleading motive and opportunity is
often too easy - one merely names the corporate officers (who
have opportunity by definition) and asserts a motive generally ap
plicable to most or all corporate officials - for example,
"[m]aintaining the prestige of a company and the value of its stock,
preventing hostile takeovers, retaining executive positions or ob
taining performance based bonuses, [or] increasing the value of an
officer's stock options or stock sales."113 A per se rule accepting
motive and opportunity pleadings would therefore invite exactly
the sort of "fraud by hindsight" complaints Congress sought to
prevent.114
Eliminating any possibility of pleading motive and opportunity,
however, sets the bar so high as to risk excluding plaintiffs with le
gitimate complaints.115 The Baesa rule effectively splits the differ
ence by giving courts license to take notice of motive and
opportunity when the facts are such that motive and opportunity
genuinely raise strong suspicion without compelling courts to accept
specious motive and opportunity showings that fail to invoke genu
ine suspicion. Eliminating the presumption that pleading motive
110. See Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 36-37 (reporting empirical research demonstrating
that the U.S. securities market is efficient, i.e., that it rapidly incorporates information
presented and adjusts prices accordingly).
111. Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 {S.D. Fla. 1998); see also S. 1260
Hearing, supra note 109, at 45 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC Chairman and Isaac C.
Hunt, Jr., SEC Commissioner) ("A higher scienter standard would lessen the incentives for
corporations to conduct a full inquiry into potentially troublesome or embarrassing areas,
and thus would threaten the disclosure process that has made our markets a model for na
tions around the world.").
112. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 31-32.
113. Malin, 17

F.

Supp. 2d at 1358.

114. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115. See Clinton Veto Message, supra note 50, at 2210; see also Rehm v. Eagle Fm. Corp.,
954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("To impose a higher pleading standard would make
it extremely difficult to sufficiently plead a lOb-5 claim - an outcome which would certainly
be contrary to the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.").
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and opportunity is per se sufficient accomplishes Congress's goal of
strengthening existing pleading requirements.116
One potential problem with the Baesa rule is the fact that
Congress hoped that the Reform Act would reduce forum shopping
by creating a nationally uniform pleading standard. The legislative
history reflects such a goal,117 as does the subsequent passage of the
Uniform Standards Act.118 The SEC rejected the Baesa rule pre
cisely because "such a test is likely to produce varying applications
of the pleading standards, a result contrary to Congress's goal of
uniformity." 119
Substantial uniformity is generated, however, merely by the act
of codifying the Second Circuit's pleading standard.120 While dif116. See Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345,
1359 (D. Colo. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08 (D.
Nev. 1998). This argument is highly significant because it accounts for a key element in the
legislative history that many courts have relied upon to strike down the "motive and opportu
nity" test entirely. Tue Conference Report states that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." Statement of Managers, supra note 4,
at 41. Numerous courts have relied upon this language to strike down the "motive and op
portunity" test. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). Tue Stratosphere court's reasoning - that eliminat
ing "the ability to rely solely on motive and opportunity" strengthens the Second Circuit's
standard, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08, accounts for this language in a way that does not require
courts to disregard the plain language of the statute, ignore significant threads in both the
contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history, or dismiss the considered opinion of the
administrative agency charged by Congress with interpreting the Reform Act.
117. See Statement of Managers, supra note 4, at 41 ("Tue House and Senate hearings on
securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish uniform . . . pleading
requirements . . . .").
118. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) ("A number of witnesses at the July 1997 hear
ing advocated legislation to establish uniform standards for private securities class action
litigation. This legislation is an outgrowth of the July 1997 hearings and subsequent investi
gation and oversight by the Committee." (footnote omitted)).
119. SEC Brief, supra note 57, at 25 n.51. While arguing for the Marksman rule, the SEC
makes the predicate arguments upon which the Baesa approach is based in an alternative
argument - "[w)hether or not [ adoption of the Second Circuit tests) is compelled as a
matter of legislative intent, Congress certainly did not foreclose the possibility of the use of
the Second Circuit tests in applying the Reform Act's pleading standard. Id. at 16. At a
minimum, therefore, this Court has the discretion to adopt the Second Circuit's tests as its
own under the Reform Act." Id. Tue fact that the Second Circuit's tests are neither man
dated nor forbidden by the Reform Act is the underlying rationale for the Baesa approach.
In its amicus brief at the district court level, the Commission more directly approved the
Baesa reasoning: "Congress simply elected not to attempt to codify the guidance provided in
Second Circuit case law, preferring to leave to the courts the discretion to create their own
standards for determining whether a plaintiff has established the required strong inference."
Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 99,
325 (N.D. Cal. 1996) quoted in SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 42.
120. Professor Grundfest has stated that codification of the Second Circuit's pleading
standard, even absent codification of the tests, achieves adequate uniformity. See Grundfest
memorandum, supra note 40, at S19,068 ("As I read the securities litigation conference re
port, the pleading standard is faithful to the Second Circuit's test. Indeed, I �oncur with the
decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which was an incomplete and inaccu
rate codification of case law in the circuit. . . . [C)odification of a uniform pleading standard
in lOb-5 cases would eliminate the current confusion among circuits. Tue Second Circuit
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ferent courts will surely see different showings as sufficient or not
sufficient under the Baesa standard, thus giving rise to some incen
tive to forum-shop, the result would be no different under the
Marksman rule, as empirically demonstrated by inconsistent rulings
within the Second Circuit.121 If the Second Circuit can have signifi
cant internal variance in its interpretation of the motive and oppor
tunity test, it would be naYve to assume that there will not be even
more variance as the other eleven circuits interpret and apply it.
Further, the Silicon Graphics rule would also risk this same incen
tive to forum shop, since it would replace the tested and interpreted
Second Circuit's standards with an untested and uninterpreted "cir
cumstantial evidence of conscious wrongdoing" standard. Faced
with the specter of allowing probable fraud to go unpunished, one
can easily imagine district court judges reaching widely varying con
clusions as to precisely what constitutes circumstantial evidence of
conscious wrongdoing.
The Baesa rule is a direct application of the plain language of
the statute. To reject it based on the uniformity issue is to ignore
the language Congress actually codified in favor of a collage of
snippets from the legislative history. Courts should generally de
cline to do this,122 especially when the relative uniformity to be
gained is so minimal.
* * *

The Baesa rule properly charts a course between two extreme
alternatives. The Marksman approach, treating recklessness and
motive and opportunity as codified, undoes too much of the
Reform Act. It would permit coercive, cookie-cutter complaints
and would allow generic litigation without actual evidence of
wrongdoing. The Silicon Graphics approach, rejecting both reck
lessness and motive and opportunity, takes the Reform Act too far.
It would block complaints with genuine merit and would encourage
corporate officials to remain purposefully ignorant of securities
standard is among the most thoroughly tested, and it also balances deterrence of unjustified
claims with the need to retain a strong private right of action
In short, I support the
pleading provision of the conference report.").
121. Compare In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that where defendant offered stock to raise capital for debt repayment purposes, plaintiff
adequately alleged motive by alleging that defendant intended to artificially enhance the
price of stock and thereby decrease dilutive effect of sale) with San Leandro Emergency
Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813-14 {2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that, where defendant issued $700 million in debt securities, plaintiff did not ade
quately allege motive by alleging that defendant intended to maintain the company's bond or
credit ratings to secure favorable debt terms).
122. While it is always relevant, legislative history cannot override a clear statutory man
date. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, {1989) {holding that the
clear meaning of the statute trumps contrary legislative history); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 896 (1984) (same). The legislative history relied on by the Baesa rule is not excluded by
these cases because it is consistent with a plain reading of the statute.
.
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fraud. The Baesa rule finds an effective middle ground by denying
litigants the ability to withstand 12(b)(6) motions merely by com
plying with a set formula, but still permitting litigants to plead reck
lessness or motive and opportunity when they have genuine reason
to do so.
CONCLUS ION
The plain language of the Reform Act simply requires that
plaintiffs in federal securities fraud cases plead facts giving rise to a
strong inference of scienter. Conspicuously absent, however, from
the plain language of the Reform Act is any mention of tests such
as motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of reckless
ness. District courts under the Reform Act must therefore scruti
nize the factual allegations in each securities fraud case to
determine whether or not those allegations give rise to a strong in
ference of scienter. In that regard, the Second Circuit's case law
may, in Senator Dodd's words, be "instructive"123
if particular
Second Circuit opinions evaluate facts similar to those of a contem
porary case, those opinions would be persuasive authority. To
whatever extent a Second Circuit opinion gives compelling reasons
for its conclusion that a particular motive and opportunity or reck
lessness showing raised a strong inference of scienter, those reasons
would continue to be persuasive and relevant in the contemporary
case.
The Baesa rule admits ambiguity, but only because it is balanc
ing the conflicting demands of discouraging securities fraud and dis
couraging frivolous lawsuits. As the case history in the Second
Circuit amply demonstrates, phrases like "motive and opportunity"
or "circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless wrongdoing"
are far from precise formulations that judges may apply to reach
clear and unambiguous results. The Reform Act shifts the locus of
uncertainty from questions such as "is this allegation of motive suf
ficiently specific to give the test any teeth?" to the dispositive ques
tion "has the plaintiff raised a strong inference of scienter?" Courts
may be guided by Second Circuit case law ip. answering that ques
tion, but they may not regard it as determinative.
-

Judge Brimmer's explanation in Queen Uno precisely captures
the point of the Reform Act:
In short, the Reform Act requires that a court examine a plaintiff's

allegations in their entirety, without regard to whether those allega
tions fall within a formalistic category such as motive and opportu
nity, to determine if the allegations permit a strong inference of
fraudulent intent. If the facts alleged permit such an inference then a
123. 141 CONG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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lOb-5 claim will by the Reform Act's plain language survive a motion
to dismiss.124
Although formalistic categories are convenient, the Reform Act
sacrifices that convenience for greater analytical rigor in each indi
vidual case. The heuristic function of the Baesa rule is to remind
litigants of the Reform Act's mandate for individualized pleadings,
without crippling necessary private enforcement of the securities
laws.

124. Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345,
1359 (D. Colo. 1998).

